Introduction 37
Construction is a hazardous sector (Im et al., 2009 ; Razak, Ibrahim, Roy, Ahmed, & Imtiaz, 38 2010; Ringen, Seegal, & Englund, 1995) . It experiences a disproportionately large number of 39 injuries and fatalities for the number of people employed, compared to other industries (Chong 40 & Low, 2014; Ringen et al., 1995; Waehrer, Dong, Miller, Haile, & Men, 2007) . Fatal 41 occupational accidents occur much more regularly in Asian countries than more established 42 market economies of the European Union, North America and Australasia (Hämäläinen, 43 Takala, & Saarela, 2006; Takala, 1999) . Two economically and culturally different countries 44 are central to the study described here, Malaysia and New Zealand. Comparing these two in 45
terms of construction industry fatalities shows Malaysia recorded a rate 2.6 times higher than 46 that of New Zealand over the period between 2013 and 2017 (see Table 1 ). 47 The danger of construction can be attributed to a variety of factors. For example, the transient 53 nature of the workforce (often referred to as 'mobility') results in low skill workers being 54 constantly introduced to the industry and moving from project to project (Fang, Chen, & Wong, 55 can be so influential on a system's behaviour that almost any human actor placed in a system 86 where those structures are present will produce the same results. 87 Guo et al.'s (2015) research led to the fabrication of 8 System Archetypes specific to 88 safety-related behaviours observed in the construction sector. These were based on data 89 collected from construction professionals in New Zealand, blended with the 8 general System 90 Archetypes created by Senge (1990) . However, Guo et al. recognised that for these structures 91 to be truly archetypal, their research must be consolidated through "future research in different 92 cultural settings" (Guo et al., 2015) . This paper attempts to validate and develop their prior 93 research using a similar methodology within the Malaysian construction industry. 94 95
Malaysian & New Zealand culture 96
Before proceeding it is necessary to establish whether New Zealand and Malaysia do indeed 97 provide different cultural settings. Malaysia's national culture features a melting pot of 98 different ethnicities and religions, contributing to a unique and diverse culture (Ahmad, 1997) . 99
Malaysian culture can be constructed from its main constituent cultures -Malay, Chinese, and 100
Indian. Religion is an acknowledged descriptive aspect of culture (Herskovits, 1949) , therefore 101 culture can be further derived from the main religious ideologies practiced by these groups. 102 Table 2 shows the contrast between the religions practiced by Malaysia and New Zealand. 103
While there are many alternative dimensions on which to differentiate cultures, based on the 104 aforementioned use of practiced religion as a proxy gauge of culture, it can be justified for the 105 intentions of this paper that New Zealand and Malaysian cultures are significantly different. 
The need and use of Safety Management Systems 140
The need to effectively manage construction safety is imperative due to the potential impact on 141 human life. For some, keeping workers safe is as much about the economic impacts associated 142 with the increasing costs of medical treatment, as it is the moral responsibility and duty of care 143 placed on them (Hinze, Pedersen, & Fredley, 1998) . Frequent and grave accidents can also 144 have a serious impact on a construction company's operations, thus again it becomes economic 145 as well as ethical to manage safety properly (Wilson & Koehn, 2000) . 146
Accidents are controlled using safety management systems which are implemented through 147 "policies, plans, procedures and processes" (Wachter & Yorio, 2014) . Examples of these 148 practices include, but are not limited to: guidelines, instructions, rules, safety toolbox talks, 149 safety training, hazard management, safety inspections, devolving power to safety officers, 150 daily communication between supervisors and workers regarding safety, declaring safety a 151 priority, greater engagement from senior management in safety, and thorough accident 152 investigation procedures (Guo et al., 2015; Vinodkumar & Bhasi, 2010) . Koh and Rowlinson 153 (2012) argue that these control-based practices are inadequate as they rely on error prevention 154 and normative compliance. Furthermore, they suggest that focus on procedure compliance is 155 at the expense of understanding the system holistically; such processes omit or overlook the 156 key dynamic interactions between workers and their tasks in a wider context. 157 158
Systems Thinking in safety 159
Systems thinking is the general name given to an approach for managing problem situations 160 that is different from, but complementary to the dominant approach. There are many 161 definitions and explanations of what constitutes systems thinking, but they are all similar in 162 essence. Von Bertalanffy (1968, p18) described the rise of the approach as a reaction to 163 problems that were not suited to classical analysis. He noted that the more traditional 164 approaches required the interactions between parts to be negligible and the relations between 165 the parts to be linear. Modern complex systems did not fit these requirements. Thus, methods 166 which broke entities or issues into their simpler parts in order to study them in relative isolation 167 under the assumption an understating of the whole could be extrapolated from this, were not 168 suitable for these complex issues (Ackoff, 1979 (Ackoff, , 2001 . The Royal Academy of Engineering 169 explains: "A system is a set of parts which, when combined, have qualities that are not present 170 in any of the parts themselves. Those qualities are the emergent properties of the system" (The 171
Royal Academy of Engineering 2007). Systems thinking, embodied in various tools and 172 methods, is therefore an approach for thinking about complex entities and issues as if they are 173 a single intricate system with associated interconnections, emergent properties and non-linear 174
behaviours. 175
Early accident causation theory developed by Heinrich (1931) through his 'domino' 176 theory suggests accidents are linear sequences of discrete actions, one causing the next, and 177 that most accidents are rooted in human error. Reason (1997) significantly advanced the 178 dominant model of accident causation to better encompass organisational accidents, through 179 his 'Swiss Cheese Model' (SCM). The SCM improved on previous developments as it took 180 into account the effects of holistic factors in a larger system as well as including the idea of 181 organisational defence layers (Reason, 1997) . The model imagined defence layers as barriers 182 between loss-causing hazards, with 'holes' in the defences allowing for accidents to occur. The 183 SCM included the consideration of these holes forming due to "active failures" (mostly human 184 factors) and "latent conditions" (mostly organisational factors). This more advanced model is 185 limited, as pointed out by Reason himself, in that it is not sufficiently dynamic (Reason, 1997) . 186
The model is better represented by moving defence layers, which change on local conditions, 187 and holes constantly changing in size -representing the ever-changing risks and contributing 188 factors to accidents. 189 Leveson (2011) suggested that such models are limited by their linear nature and 190 presumption of a "root cause". The inadequacy of assuming a root causes for an accident is 191 that the choice of an "initial event" is subjective and thus a human decision, deeming activities 192 preceding the "initial event" as irrelevant, has to be made (Leveson, 2011 interactions between components in advanced socio-technical systems (Qureshi, 2007) . For 196 example, a supervisor instructing a worker to perform a task, then reviewing the progress of 197 the task so that they can further instruct the worker creates a simple feedback loop that would 198 not be adequately captured by these linear cause and effect models. and Processes (STAMP) (Leveson, 2011) , Functional Resonance Analysis Method (FRAM) 202 (Hollnagel & Goteman, 2004) and Accimapping (Rasmussen, 1997) have been said to avoid 203 some of the limitations of these more traditional approaches (Underwood & Waterson, 2013) . 204
Crucially, SAA views accidents as an "emergent phenomena", resultant of the complex 205 interaction of systems components (Qureshi, 2007) , thus understanding the dynamic interacting 206 nature of factors within these incidents is critical. 207 STAMP is a control based theory that examines interactions between system 208 components and views accidents as a result of inadequate control of these components 209 (Leveson, 2011) . FRAM constructs a network of interrelating subsystems, with the behaviour 210 of any one system component able to 'resonate' with that of others. Such resonance within 211 components can result in dramatic system-level variation that pushes it out of control and to 212 the point where an accident develops (Hollnagel, 2012) . Accimap is a model that links failures 213 across six socio-technical system levels (Salmon, Cornelissen, & Trotter, 2012) , based on 214
Rasmussen's socio-technical framework (Rasmussen, 1997) . A cause-consequence chart is 215 used to analyse cause events and link different factors across the various system levels 216 (Qureshi, 2007) . While these SAA methods are widely used in accident analysis (specifically 217 STAMP and Accimap) (Salmon et al., 2012) , they are considered as "resource intensive" as 218 well as requiring "considerable amounts of domain and theoretical knowledge to apply" 219 (Underwood & Waterson, 2013) . 220
System dynamics was first pioneered by Forrester (Forrester, 1961) and was developed 221 into a methodology for understanding "the structure and dynamics of complex systems" 222 (Sterman, 2000) . It embodies, and is to some synonymous with, systems thinking. The notion 223 that systems thinking can be used to interpret intricate systems was echoed by Checkland 224 (1981) , who stated that systems thinking was "the use of a particular set of ideas, systems ideas, 225 in trying to understand the world's complexity" (Checkland, 1981 ). Furthermore, system 226 dynamics related methodsnamely causal loop diagrams (see Figure 1a and Figure 1b )may 227 be better suited for the problems associated with traditional accident models as they emphasise 228 the circular nature of complex systems -there is "no difference between cause and effect" (Goh, 229 Brown, & Spickett, 2010). Causal loop diagrams can be used to create generic and frequently 230 occurring system structures to describe common behaviours, called system archetypes, which 231 are useful to identify points of leverage for change (Goh et al., 2010) . These system archetypes 232 can be viewed as "classifying structures responsible for generic patterns of behaviour over 233 time" (E F Wolstenholme, 2003) . 234 Systems thinking is suitable to understand the complexity (Checkland, 1981; Maani & 235 Maharaj, 2004; Sterman, 2000) presented by construction accidents while system archetypes 236 provide a concise way to visualise the complexity (Goh et al., 2010) . 237 238
Study aims 239
As outlined in the previous section, the of use systems thinking in relation to safety is an 240 effective way to conceptualise the complex issues present. It also provides a platform from 241 which further safety improvements in the construction sector can be made (P. Mitropoulos, 242 Abdelhamid Senge (1990) used this modelling approach to represent archetypal causal structures that 286 underpin organisational issues, subsequently reinterpreted and developed by Marais et al 287 (2006) into system safety-specific archetypes. Such system archetypes are fundamental to 288 system dynamics modelling (Eric F. Wolstenholme, 2004) . Construction safety archetypes 289 then are simply system safety archetypes applied in the context of construction. They are 290 intended to describe the causal structures that result in individual safety issues, rather than the 291 whole system. 292
The first step in developing such representation involves the identification of the themes 293 relating to an issue; the key variables associated with each theme or problem are also 294 established (Guo et al., 2015) . The second step requires the generalisation of these variables 295 such that they are no longer event-specific, instead describing a generic pattern of behaviour, 296 by exploring their causal affiliation with each other (Guo et al., 2015) . 297 298
Grounded Theory for data collection 299
Grounded Theory, conceived by Glaser and Strauss (1967) , is a methodology for 300 creating theory that is "grounded in data systematically gathered and analysed" (Strauss & 301 Corbin, 1994) . As part of the process, Grounded Theory stipulates an analysis of constant 302 comparison of data sources and of theory to data in order to identify emergent concepts (Glaser 303 & Strauss, 1967) . Thus, based on Grounded Theory, concurrent data collection, data analysis, 304 archetype development, and constant comparison of data and models is performed. The data, 305 in this case from interviews, is analysed and progressively abstracted such that it is described 306 in terms of higher-order categories. The process as applied here is described in the subsequent 307 sections. 308
Interview structure, sample strategy, and sample participants 310
Seven semi-structured interviews were conducted (i.e. there was a predefined set of questions, 311 but participants were able to deviate from those and talk freely). Semi-structured interviews 312 are "particularly effective" as a method of gathering data when developing causal diagrams 313 (Sterman, 2000) . Interviews focused on identifying the main safety themes through broad 314 questions, spanning a multitude of topics. When a new theme revealed itself, further questions 315 were directed on that specific line of thought. Due to the concurrent nature of data collection 316 and analysis when utilising Grounded Theory, pointed questions were formulated between 317 interviews, based on previous respondents, about specific safety topics. These questions were 318 then asked to subsequent interviewees after they had referenced the relevant topic. 319
The precedent in Grounded Theory sampling is to employ sampling techniques 320 sequentially (known as directed sampling) as data is collected and the theoretical model under study, be willing to participate, give enough time to fully explain their experience, and 329 be articulate and reflective (Bryant et al., 2010) . The participants of this study fulfil those 330 criteria. All participants were fluent in English, and willingly volunteered at least 30 minutes 331 of their time (mean interview length: 45 minutes). Only one interview was not conducted face-332 to-face, this interview was conducted via Skype. 333
Data analysis -Inductive System Diagrams 339
Inductive system diagram (ISD) methodology is one in which causal loop diagrams can be 340 constructed through concept development of field data (Burchill & Fine, 1997) . It utilises the 341 grounded theory method to develop key variables that are closely linked to the data. Following 342 this, the ISD methodology allows for these key variables to be causally linked via causal loop 343 diagrams (Burchill & Fine, 1997) . Thus, the causal loop diagrams (and resulting archetypes) 344 are markedly 'grounded' in the data collected, lending to their validity. The development 345 process of ISD methodology, adapted for the creation of a system archetype, is outlined in 346 
Coding techniques 349
The standard grounded theory method for processing interview data was followed. This 350 consisted of three 'coding' stages. The first was 'open coding', in which interview 351 transcriptions were processed line-by-line, tagging data as 'nodes'. Nodes can be thought of as 352 folders representing an event, theme, or behaviour, which were filled with quotes taken from 353 the raw data. These quotes are 'coded' under a specific node. Nodes describing similar events, 354 variables, or topics were then grouped to form key themesthis allowed for the main safety 355 themes to be identified. As this process was carried out, memos were taken as insight into the 356 topic was gained and new theories began to formulate.
Upon the initial identification of a safety theme the second stage -'selective coding' -358 was performed. Interview data was analysed by studying the events and ideas mentioned by 359 participants to understand the behaviour patterns that they were speaking about, and determine 360 under which themes these behaviours occur. This also allowed the determination of causal 361 relationships between variables by utilising an adjacency matrix, which explored the affiliation 362 between variables and whether the effect one had on another was positive or negative. Based 363 on these causal links, word-arrow diagrams and self-contained causal loops were created. 
Establishing causal relationships from data 376
Exemplification of the process carried out in creating causal loop diagrams from interview data 377 is outlined in Table 4 . Open coding was used to tag the quotes shown under various themes 378 (quotes can be tagged under more than one theme). Selective coding then allowed for the causal 379 relationship between these themes to be explored, and the creation of causal links following 380 that. 381
382
Selective coding is used to combine the causal links shown in Table 4 to form a causal loop, as 388 seen in Figure 3 . Multiple feedback loops like this are then integrated together to create a 389 system archetype by utilising theoretical coding. The quotes shown in Table 4 did not all come 390 from the same source, highlighting the complex nature of construction behaviour and the lack 391 of holistic knowledge possessed by members in the system. Causal arrows bisected by two 392 parallel lines show a relationship that has a delay. 393 The interviews and open coding processes revealed a multitude of behaviours, which were 401 grouped into nodes, safety themes, and then eventually combined to form safety archetypes as 402 shown in Table 5 . 403
394
Each of the archetypes mentioned above will be explored in-depth, and leverage points (places 409 to intervene in the system to counter unwanted behaviour) identified. Quotes from interviewees 410 are included in italics. 411 workforce. However, this perception is incorrect as noted by an interviewee: "training people 437 to do the job means that they will do the job more safely and more quickly". This is depicted 438 by the 'creation of an unskilled workforce' (R2) loop; untrained staff are more likely to be 439 involved in accidents, after which they are replaced by new, similarly unskilled workers -440 perpetuating the cycle. The 'disregard for safety procedure' (R1) reinforcing loop shows a 441 common vicious cycle that is cultivated in Malaysian construction. Schedule delays are 442 inevitably incurred when accidents happen, resulting in slowed progress. The stagnation of 443 production progress generates an increased cost to the contractor which, as previously 444 discussed, is the antithesis to their project goal -make the most money possible. This means 445 that the production pressure on site is increased to try to make up for this lost time. Increased 446 production pressure then often leads to safety practices being ignored in favour of quicker 447 work, which inevitably results in more unsafe behaviours and accidents -"[upon the 448 occurrence of delays, site managers] scream at their workers, who are just general workers, 449 and health and safety goes out the window". 450 451
Leverage points 452
Moving Malaysia away from an unskilled foreign workforce would help to alleviate a number 453 of construction safety issues in the country. However, the problem of the migrant workforce is 454 not one that can be solved quickly nor easily, and for broader national and industry factors may 455 not even be feasible, thus it will be more suitable to focus on the training provided to these 456 labourers. Providing translated training courses and general communications training for 457 employees that are not proficient in the local language will reduce problems associated with 458 work orders and skills training. This will also reduce the reliance on a lingua franca with which 459 verbal exchange is often misinterpreted. These steps will help to combat the negative 460 behaviours of (R3) and (R4) reinforcing loops. Furthermore, the introduction of the balancing 461 loop shown in Figure 5 will aid in alleviating the negative impacts of the reinforcing loop (R1). 462
This loop could be practically implemented through the use of independent accident 463 investigators. 464 Figure 6 shows a construction safety archetype describing behaviours exhibited by clients and 471 contractors at the highest levels of Malaysian construction. One of the main themes of this 472 archetype is that the foreign workforce is held with such little regard (S2) that it is almost 473 viewed as dispensable. This means that even when accidents occur, they have little to no effect 474 on contractors and clients. 475
Corporate accountability and profit driven business culture 470
The 'person approach' (B1) and 'side effect of person approach' (R1) are loops forming the 481 "Blame on workers" archetype devised by Guo et al. (2015) . Blaming workers reduces unsafe 482 behaviours in the short term as it prevents minor transgressions and promotes procedural 483 adherence. However, it also means more fundamental root causes and latent failures in the 484 system go unidentified, as well as the procedures that prompted the transgressionsultimately 485 leading to the accident rate increasing. This archetype was determined to also occur in 486
Malaysian construction but as can be seen, has an array of other feedback loops associated with 487 it that are not present in Guo et al.'s research. 488 Furthermore, the tendency to blame workers is facilitated by the nature of the 489 workforce; being made up of a migrant (often illegal) majority whom are offered little 490 protection, particularly in the case of illegal workers -"you often hear: "it was the dumb 491 migrants fault, he didn't listen to me, and that's why this accident has happened". They've 492 become the scapegoat, so there's no accountability." This leads into the 'value placed on 493 workforce' (R2) reinforcing loop, in which limited accountability for accidents leads to the 494 propensity of disregarding the safety of the foreign workforce. Interview data has indicated that 495 foreign workers are already held in low regard by the contractors managing them -"the 496
Indonesians are just looked down on by everybody, same with the Bangladeshis, and same with 497 the Pakistanis" due to a myriad of culture factors (not featured in the archetype). This allows 498 contractors to "get away with accidents", further lowering the value placed on the workforce. 499
Intuitively this will influence the safety culture on site, which will affect the unsafe behaviours 500 (and therefore accidents) that occur. The 'no training for workers' (R3) reinforcing loop shows 501 the ease at which workers are terminated from Malaysian construction sites. Blaming workers 502 for accidents increases the workforce turnover, which leads to a decrease in training as 503 contractors don't believe in investing in a workforce that is quick to turnover -"the turnover 504 of staff reduces the willingness of contractors to train them -it's money down the drain". 505 506
Leverage points 507
The common practice of blaming workers to reduce unsafe behaviours is clearly shown to be 508 an ineffective safety management strategy; the loops (R1), (R2), and (R3) exhibit the ways in 509 which this method is flawed. The simplest way to mitigate the negative impacts of these loops 510 would be to eliminate the practice of blaming workers. This may be difficult to achieve due to 511 construction management's reluctance to take ownership of accidents, as it is often easier and 512 cheaper to terminate workers than to change working procedures and pay accident related fines. 513
A change in regulation to allow more blame to be attributed to employing organisations, and 514 heavier fines for infractions, would force a shift in the priorities held by construction managers. 515
However, the problems associated with increased regulation (discussed in section 4.3) would 516 have to be addressed. 517 518 4.3 Issues in the regulatory system 519 Figure 7 shows a construction safety archetype describing behaviour shown by Malaysian 520 regulators and legislators. It is a modified version of Senge's "fixes that fail" archetype (Senge, 521 1990 ). The main theme of this archetype is the effect that enforcement has on safety 522 performance. Analysis has suggested that enforcement of regulation is extremely poor in 523 Malaysia, to the extent that contractors are comfortable in taking risk to avoid compliance with 524 regulation in an attempt to save cost. 525
The 'penalisation inducing corruption' balancing loop (B3) demonstrates the ability of 531 contractors/clients to avoid penalisation for noncompliance. This is enabled by the 532 susceptibility of governmental agents to bribes and pressure from those in positions of power. 533 "Corruption is rife, and with that there's always the opportunity for something to be covered 534 up or paid off". The construction industry has been identified as "the most corrupt sector in the 535 world" (de Jong, Henry, & Stansbury, 2009); coupling this with Malaysia's reputation as a 536 place rife with corruption (Alam Siddiquee, 2006) , it is no surprise that corruption plays a large 537 role in the Malaysian construction industry. The ability to avoid penalties is exploited by 538 contractors as a way to evade costly compliance with regulation, as they know that they will 539 not be penalised; "Inspectors can be paid off if they do go and find something". This effect is 540 carried into the 'effect of penalty on safety performance' (B2) balancing loop in which the 541 avoidance of penalties induces a lower level of safety motivation and then performance -542 leading to more accidents. The 'performance reducing budget' (B1) balancing loop shows the 543 delayed effect that safety performance has on budgeting. However, safety budget is often cut 544 regardless of performance in an attempt to gain better profit margins -"The contractor is 545 always trying to look for ways to get higher profit, so they tend to cut, cut, cut safety budget." 546 thus further impacting loop (B2). The 'safety performance' (B4) balancing loop shows the 547 interconnected nature of performance and legislation. However, it must be noted that 548 interviewees have detailed a marked inflexibility in government regarding the change of 549 legislation, meaning that causal link between safety performance and legislation is weak -"To 550 actually make that [legislative] change would take an additional workload for somebody, are 551 they willing to do that? From what I'm seeing, I don't see a willingness to change" 552 553
Leverage points 554
The problem of legislative enforcement is one that was often mentioned by interviewees. As 555 mentioned above, corruption is a large contributing factor to the lack of enforcement, however 556 it is also affected by Malaysia's low governmental safety budget. In combination, these factors 557 lead to a void in the enforcement of regulation, which is exploited by contractors to cut corners 558 and utilise unsafe practices. To reduce these practices, loop (B3) needs to be opposed. This 559 could be done through the introduction of policies that improve the transparency of 560 construction transactions, particularly those paid to governmental agencies. Transparent 561 actions would discourage government officials from accepting bribery payments as it would 562 be easier to recognise corrupt activities. 563 564
Discussion 565
The three 'construction safety archetypes' detailed indicate patterns of behaviour, and the 566 causal structures that produce them, at different hierarchical levels of the Malaysian 567 construction industry. 568
The 'effects of a migrant workforce', 'corporate accountability and profit driven 569 business culture', and 'issues in the regulatory system' archetypes show behaviour at site 570 management, senior management, and governmental levels, respectivelyeach subsequent 571 model serves to contextualise the previous one. These models describe the underlying 572 behavioural structures found in Malaysia, indicating why certain construction behaviours are 573 observed. Using systems thinking in this context allows for a greater understanding of the 574 complex interconnectivity of management decisions and systems throughout hierarchical 575 levels. Furthermore, these archetypes reveal causal relationships that are not obvious, allowing 576 for an analysis of procedures and their effects that would have otherwise thought to be unrelated 577 or counterintuitive. For example, the 'effects of a migrant workforce' archetype reveals an 578 unlikely causal link in which the communication issues presented by a foreign workforce 579 eventually leads to more foreign workers being hired (reinforcing loop 'unforeseen impacts of 580 communication issues' (R4)). This example shows the strength of dynamic system analysis to 581 fully identify all of a systems characteristics. 
